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Currents in the Stream:
The Evolving Legal Status of Gay
and Lesbian Persons in Kentucky
BY MATTHEW M. MORRISON*
INTRODUCTION
n 1992, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v.
Wasson,' one of the court's most controversial decisions of the
1990s. The court struck down Kentucky's criminal statute proscrib-
ing consensual homosexual sodomy on privacy and equal protection
grounds.2 Clearly, this decision was a pivotal development in the evolution
of the legal status of homosexuals in the Commonwealth. Prior to Wasson,
gay and lesbian Kentuckians were rendered sexual offenders because of
purely private conduct? After Wasson, these same Kentuckians could, at
minimum, attempt to lead their lives without being branded criminals.
The court in Wasson characterized their decision not as "the leading
edge of change," but as "a part of the moving stream." When Kentucky
joined this stream it marked a change in the legal status of gays' in the
Commonwealth. Part I of this Article discusses the pre-Wasson era-a time
when same-gender intimacy was criminalized, a periodwhen Kentucky was
not yet in the stream's waters.6 Under the law, gays were merely offenders
whose private lives needed to be controlled. Part II briefly reviews the
Wasson decision 7 -when Kentucky waded into the stream-with attention
* B.S. 1986, Virginia Tech; J.D. 1998, Mercer University; M.S.L.S. 1999,
University of Kentucky. Admitted to Practice 1999, State of Georgia.
ICommonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).2 1d. at 491-92.
3 See discussion infra Part I.
4 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
5This author uses the term "gays" to refer to both male and female homosexual
persons.
6See infra text accompanying notes 10-67.
' A previous issue of the Kentucky Law Journal offers an in-depth discussion
of Wasson. Special Feature, Commonwealth v. Wasson: Invalidating Kentucky's
Sodomy Statute, 81 KY. L.J. 423 (1993).
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to the transformation that it represented Part I looks beyond Wasson to
determine that Kentucky is part of the moving stream, neither too far ahead
nor too far behind.9
I. BEFORE WASSON: OUT OF THE WATER -
In Kentucky, the firs-t sodomy statute was enacted in 1798.1" However,
by the late eighteenth century, sodomy proscriptions were already well-
established in Anglo-American law. During medieval times, sodomy was
a religious offense punished by the ecclesiastical courts." Moreover,
sodomy, as conceptualized by Christian theology and Anglo-American law,
appears to have its origin in those same medieval times.'
According to Professor Mark Jordan, the term "sodomy"-"sodomia"
in Latin-was coined by theologian Peter Damian in the eleventh cen-
tury.3 The term resulted from a long process of "thinning and
condensing."14 The story of the city of Sodom was distilled into a story of
the punishment of a single, specifically stigmatized sin." Jordan asserted
that this distillation was the result of a process in which details and
qualifications were eliminated "in order to enable an excessive simplifica-
tion in thought." 6
'See infra text accompanying notes 68-111.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 112-263.
1o Act of February 10, 1798, ch. 4, § 4,2 Littell's Laws ofKentucky 12 (1810),
repealed by Act to adopt the Revised Statutes, ch. 358, § 2, 1851 Ky. Acts 32
(replacing laws adopted prior to November 1851 with Revised Statutes of 1852).
The court in Wasson stated that the original sodomy statute was found in the
Kentucky Revised Statutes of 1860. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,
490-91 (Ky. 1992). This author, however, has traced the statutory sodomy pro-
scriptions in the Commonwealth back to the late eighteenth century. Part I of this
Article provides a complete history of sodomy laws in Kentucky.
" Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska 1969).
12 See generally MARK D. JORDAN, THE INVENTION OF SODOMY IN CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY (1997) (tracing the history of the concept of sodomy from its roots). In
the prelude of the book, Jordan stated his intention "to recover the medieval acts
of invention that constituted Sodomy and prepared for its long-standing effects."
Id. at 1.
11 Id. at29.
14 Id.
15 Id.16 Id.
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The category of sodomy was created even though there was no specific
connection between the city ofSodom and same-sex copulation.7 Actually,
the sin of Sodom was as much non-sexual as sexual; the story of Sodom
seems to be one of inhospitality."8 There is no conclusive reference in
biblical texts that the sexual activity connected to Sodom necessarily
involved same-gender intimacy.19
Jordan explained that the concept of sodomy was and is tied to the
unsettled place of the erotic in Christian love.20 Jordan advanced that the
church's historic exclusion of women indicates that there have been, and
can be, familial communities of Christian men who live together and love
one another, sometimes erotically and even genitally, in rejection of the
heterosexual concept of family.2" While the distinction between brotherly
love--agape--and non-Christian sexual love--eros--has been applied to
these communities, this distinction fails to recognize that erotic relations do
exist between Christians and these are often subsumed within agape.' This
failed distinction, as well as the negative judgment of all non-procreative
sex, may be why there have been and still are theological issues surround-
ing same-sex love? Ultimately, Christianity's failure to resolve the
problem of the erotic spawned and maintains sodomy as a category to be
condemned, an isolation of the erotic to be portrayed in frightening terms.'
Thus, Jordan concluded that sodomy is not a human behavior, but "a failure
of theologians."
Against this theological backdrop, sodomy regulation developed.
Considering its roots in the theology of the Middle Ages, it is not unex-
pected that sodomy was punished by the medieval ecclesiastical courts.26
While sodomy was not an offense at early common law, England's secular
courts punished the crime after the Statute of Henry VIIY
In 1533, the Reformation Parliament enacted a statute making the
"'vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast"' punishable by
1 Id. at 30.
Is Id.
19 See id. at 30-34.
20 Id. at 175-76.
21 Id. at 175.
22Id.
2Id.
24Id. at 175-76.
25 Id. at 176.
21 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
27 Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 649 (Alaska 1969).
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death.28 This secularization of the crime was attributed to Henry VIII's
renunciation of the Roman Catholic Church.' Later case law clarified that
buggery included anal intercourse between two men or between a man and
a woman, while oral sex was not included. 0 Lesbian sex was not covered
by the 1533 statute.3
English sodomy law generally applied in early America. The sixteenth
century statutes constituted common law that was incorporated into
American law.32 As well, various colonies enacted statutes based upon the
1533 enactment. In 1656, the New Haven Colony prohibited both male-
male and female-female sex, while the Connecticut Colony eliminated
prohibitions on female-female sex when it formed in 1665." The James-
town Colony similarly echoed English law by prohibiting sodomy in its
early statutes.34
Kentucky was also influenced by English sodomy law. In 1789,
Virginia consented to the severance of the District of Kentucky. 5 At that
time, pre-1607 acts of parliament that were of a general nature, not local to
England, applicable to the Virginia colonists, and not repugnant to the
various enactments of the Virginia general convention were part of the law
of Virginia.36 Later, the entire body of statutory law that was in force in
28 WILLIAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 157 (1999). The 1533 statute was repealed during the reign of Queen
Mary, but was reenacted upon the ascension of Elizabeth I. Harris, 457 P.2d at 649
n.42.29 ESKRIGE, supra note 28, at 157.
30 Id. (citing Rex v. Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (1817)).
31 Id.
32 Harris, 457 P.2d at 649 (citing Patterson v. Win, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233,241
(1831)).33 ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 157.34Arthur E. Brooks, Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Con-
stitutional, 26 WM. & MARYL. REv. 645,649 (1985) (citing FOR THE COLONY IN
VIRGINIA BRITANNIA: LAWS DIVINE, MORALL AND MARTIAL, ETC., art. 9, at 12
(London 1612) (compiled by W. Strachery, 1969)).
35Lyman Chalkley, TheSources, Progress andPrinted Evidences ofthe Written
Law in Kentucky, 12 KY. L.J. 43, 48 (1923). Kentucky became the westernmost
county of Virginia in 1776; as it was divided into additional counties, it became
known as the District of Kentucky. ROBERT M. IRELAND, THE KENTUCKY STATE
CONSTITUTION: AREFERENCE GUIDE 1 (1999). In 1791, Congress enacted a statute
to admit Kentucky to the union, with admission occurring on June 1, 1792. Id. at
2. 36Chalkey, supra note 35, at 48-49.
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Virginia at the time of Kentucky's founding became part of Kentucky
law). 7 Further, later pronouncements of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
indicated that English common law as of 1607 was fundamental law in
Kentucky s
In 1798, the young state of Kentucky codified various crimes, including
sodomy. 9 The sodomy statute, which immediately followed a rape statute,
stated: "Every person duly convicted of the crime of sodomy, shall be
sentenced to undergo a similar confinement, for a period of time not less
than two, nor more than five years.... ." The 1798 statute was maintained
in later statutory compilations published in 182241 and 1834.42 Interestingly,
sodomy was not defined. However, Kentucky was not unique in that regard:
the other young states did not define it either because it was a sin "not to
be named."'43
The 1798 sodomy statute was unaltered until the early 1850s. The first
revision of Kentucky statutory law took place in 1850 and 1851.'
Commissioners were empowered by the legislature to organize state
statutes by eliminating repealed acts, rewording text, and arranging them
by subject into a code of law.45 The revised sodomy statute also proscribed
buggery: "Whoever shall be convicted of the crime of sodomy or buggery
with man or beast, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two
nor more than five years."46 Other states were also revising their sodomy
37 Id. at 49-50.
3 Id. at 47.
3"Act ofFebruary 10, 1798, ch. 4, § 4,2 Littell's Laws of Kentucky 12 (1810),
repealed by Act to adopt the Revised Statutes, ch. 358, § 2, 1851 Ky. Acts 32
(replacing laws adopted prior to November 1851 with Revised Statutes of 1852).
4oId
41 Act of February 10, 1798, ch. 144, § 4, 2 Digest of the Statute Law of
Kentucky 984 (1822), repealedby Act to adopt the Revised Statutes, ch. 358, § 2,
1851 Ky. Acts 32 (replacing laws adopted prior to November 1851 with the
Revised Statutes of 1852).
42 Act of February 10, 1798, Penal Laws, 1798, § 4,2 A Digest of Statute Laws
of Kentucky 1265 (1834), repealed by Actto adopt the Revised Statutes, ch. 358,
§ 2, 1851 Ky. Acts 32 (replacing laws adopted prior to November 1851 with the
Revised Statutes of 1852).
43 ESKRiDGE, supra note 28, at 157-58.
" Kurt X. Metzmeier, Kentucky Statutory Authority, in KENTUCKY LEGAL
RESEARCH MANUAL 3-1, 3-12 (Kurt X. Metzmeier et al. eds., 2000).451Id. at 3-12.
46 REV. STAT. KY. ch. 28, art. 4, § II (Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas 1852),
repealedbyActto Revise the Statute Laws ofthe Commonwealth, ch. 208, §§ 1-4,
1942 Ky. Acts 909-10 (replacing all prior statutory law with the Kentucky Revised
2000-2001] 1163
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statutes in the mid-nineteenth century, but the term "the infamous crime
against nature" was favored over others.47 Regardless of the language used,
judges and commentators interpreted the statutes to criminalize" 'unnatu-
ral"' intercourse between two men or between a man and a woman.48 In
Kentucky, it was not until the early twentieth century that the sodomy
statute was clarified.49
In 1891, Kentucky ratified a new constitution, and bills were prepared
to conform state statutes to the new fundamental law of the Common-
wealth5 In 1894, John D. Carroll codified the statutes and continued to
publish regular compilations until 1936." The text of the 1850's sodomy
and buggery proscription was maintained throughout Carroll's compilations
under "Other Felonies." 2 After significant statutory revision in 1942, the
sodomy statute--without change-was recodified under "Offenses Against
Morality," which included incest and fornication 3
While sodomy was certainly a mainstay of criminal law in Kentucky,
it was not until the early twentieth century that a Kentucky court actually
clarified what constituted the offense of sodomy. As of 1903, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals seemed to believe that what constituted sodomy was
generally understood by most people when it stated that "[e]very person of
ordinary intelligence understands what is meant by a charge of sodomy." 4
However, in 1909 the same court decided Commonwealth v. Poindexter and
clarified that sodomy was anal intercourse "between two human beings, or
man and man," and that buggery was intercourse with an animal." In that
case, two black men were charged with sodomy for having engaged in oral
Statutes).
4 7 ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 158.41 Id. It seems that, in Kentucky, buggery was an act performed with an animal
because the term "beast" was not included in the prior version of the sodomy
statute.49 See infia notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
" Metzmeier, supra note 44, at 3-12.
51 Id.52 Ky. Stat. ch. 36, § 1218 (Baldwin 1915) (commonly referred to as "Carroll's
Kentucky Statutes" because the code was prepared by John D. Carroll), repealed
byActto Revisethe StatuteLaws ofthe Commonwealth, ch. 208, §§ 1-4, 1942 Ky.
Acts 909-10 (replacing all prior statutory law with the Kentucky Revised Statutes).
51 See NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS TO THE KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 1879
(Robert K. Cullen & L.C. Turner eds., 1944). See also KY. REV. STAT. [hereinafter
K.R.S.] ch. 436, § 436.050-.070 (1962) (maintaining same sodomy statute).
' White v. Commonwealth, 73 S.W. 1120 (Ky. 1903).
5 Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 118 S.W. 943, 944 (Ky. 1909).
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sex.16 After reviewing various authorities, the court determined that an oral
penetration was not sodomy5 Indeed, this decision reflected the prevailing
view of the time.5
As the twentieth century progressed, sodomy laws became atool ofthe
state to penalize homosexuals. During the post-war period sodomy arrests
increased, and homosexuals became the primary target of enforcement.59
In 1974, Kentucky enacted the Kentucky Penal Code,6 drawing heavily
from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.61 In the new Penal
Code, sodomy was classified into four degrees, three of which covered
nonconsensual acts. Sodomy in the fourth degree criminalized consensual
homosexual relations. The Code read:
(1) A person is guilty of sodomy in the fourth degree when he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex. (2)
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 82 of this Act, consent of the
other person shall not be a defense under this section, nor shall lack of
consent of the other person be an element of this offense. (3) Sodomy in
the fourth degree is a Class A misdemeanor. 62
With this revision, the legislature took care to proscribe oral sex and to
exempt married couples from sodomy laws when it defined "deviate sexual
intercourse" as including "any act of sexual gratification between persons
not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another."63
56 Id. The case was typical in that the defendants were African-Americans.
Statistics indicate that as of 1880 two-thirds of the persons imprisoned for sodomy
were of color and/or foreign immigrants. ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 158.
57 Poindexter, 118 S.W. at 944. Later, the Sixth Circuit found that under
Kentucky law an anal penetration was necessary to commit sodomy. United States
v. Milby, 400 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1968).
"' ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 158-59. In 1879, Pennsylvania became the first
state to include oral sex as sodomy; prior to this, Anglo-American authority
generally accepted that oral sex was not encompassed by sodomy, buggery, or
crime against nature laws. Id. at 158.
59 See id. at 159.
' Kentucky Penal Code Act, ch. 406, § 1, 1974 Ky. Acts 831.
61Kathleen F. Brickey, An Introduction to the Kentucky Penal Code: A Critique
ofPure Reason?, 61 KY. L.J. 624,625 (1973).
62 Kentucky Penal Code Act § 90 (codified atK.IRS. § 5 10.100 (Banks-Baldwin
1999)).
' Kentucky Penal Code Act § 81(1) (codified at K.R.S. § 510.010(1) (Banks-
Baldwin 1999)). See Kentucky Penal Code Act §§ 87-90 (making deviant sexual
intercourse the primary element of all degrees of sodomy).
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Kentucky was not unique in decriminalizing different-sex sodomy
while continuing to criminalize same-sex sodomy. While developing the
Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute ("AL") stated that
consensual sex was outside the realm of legitimate governmental regula-
tion.6" However, states with a significant conservative religious presence
ignored the ALI and continued to criminalize homosexual relations,
apparently due to moral opposition to homosexuality. Curiously, these
states decriminalized heterosexual sodomy despite the view that it too was
sinful." Whether Kentuckians in 1974 viewed heterosexual sodomy as
somehow acceptable we will never know. It may be that maintaining
homosexual-only sodomy proscriptions had more to do with the feelings
people had toward homosexuals.67
II. WASSON: KENTUCKY WADES INTO THE STREAM
Less than twenty years later, the 1974 sodomy statute met its doom. In
1992, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated rights of
both privacy and equal protection guaranteed by the Kentucky
Constitution." The case began in 1985 when the Lexington, Kentucky
police department decided to enforce the statute.69 The police department
did this by visiting a local gay bar and engaging men in suggestive
conversation, encouraging the target to describe activities that would take
place if the two men were to leave together. 0 Then, the officer would arrest
the target on a charge of solicitation to commit sodomy.7 One of the men
charged, Jeffrey Wasson, challenged the sodomy statute, ultimately
prevailing in the state's highest court.'
64 ESKRiDGE, supra note 28, at 159.
6s Id. at 106.
6Id.
67 See id. at 57-97 (reviewing the history of animus toward homosexuals in the
United States and the expression ofthat animus through law); William N. Eskridge,
Jr.,PrivacyJurisprudenceandthe Apartheidofthe Closet, 1946-1961,24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 703 app. 6 at 829-38 (1997) (reprinting minutes of a 1964 Florida
criminal code revision committee that focused largely on homosexuals and the
regulation of homosexuals).
6S Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,491-92 (Ky. 1992).
69 Shirley A. Weigand & Sara Farr, Part of the Moving Stream: State Con-
stitutional Law, Sodomy, and Beyond, 81 KY. L.J. 449 (1993).
70 Id.
71 Id.
2Id.
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Several commentators have written about the Wasson decision and the
constitutional grounds upon which it was based.' These writers often
discuss the significant role the state constitution played in the decision and
the opportunities that state constitutions offer to litigants frustrated by
the limits of the Federal Constitution.74 Here, however, the goal is to
briefly review the main points of the decision and to consider it in broader
context.
The first right violated by the sodomy statute was that of privacy. The
Kentucky Supreme Court found that a greater privacy right exists under the
Kentucky Constitution than under the Federal Constitution and rejected the
Commonwealth's argument that Bowers v. Hardwick" was dispositive. s
The court determined that the 1891 constitutional debates and prior case
law indicated that broader protections were afforded by the state constitu-
tion.' Further, sections 1 and 2 of the Kentucky Constitution7 were found
to provide the source of the privacy right despite there being no mention of
a right of privacy in the constitutional debates---this lack of articulation
was attributed to the fact that the concept of privacy as a legal right was not
' See, e.g., Susan Ayres, Coming Out: Decision-Making in State and Federal
Sodomy Cases, 62 ALB. L. REv. 355 (1998); John C. Roach, Note, Rule ofMen, 81
KY. L.J. 483 (1993); Recent Case, State Constitutions-Homosexual Sodomy--
Kentucky Supreme Court Finds That Criminalization of Homosexual Sodomy
Violates State Constitutional Guarantees of Privacy and Equal Protection, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1370 (1993); Elizabeth A. Leveno, Comment, New Hope for the
New Federalism: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 62 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1029 (1994).
4 See Weigand & Farr, supra note 69, at 449-50.
7' Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the federal right to
privacy does not extend to homosexual sodomy).
76 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d487, 493 (Ky. 1992). The Common-
wealth asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court's narrow interpretation ofthe right to
privacy as expressed in Bowers was controlling because the Kentucky Constitution
conferred no greater right to privacy than afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at
490.
7id. at 494.
The pertinent text of these sections quoted by the court reads:
§ 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: First: The right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties .... Third: The right of
seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
§ 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.
Id. (quoting Ky. CONST. §§ 1, 2).
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explored until Warren and Brandeis's Harvard Law Review article of
1890.
79
The court in Wasson then reviewed several early twentieth century
cases that invalidated various liquor control laws, 0 paying particular
attention to Commonwealth v. Campbell."' At issue in Campbell was an
ordinancethat criminalized possession ofintoxicating liquorofgreaterthan
a certain quantity even though the liquor was possessed for private use. 2
The court struck down the ordinance, stating that "[i]t is not within the
competency of government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and to
regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned, or to
prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not directly injure
society."'"
The court in Wasson considered this language, as well as other
passages from the Campbell opinion, as an interpretation that the Kentucky
Bill of Rights implicitly defined a right of privacy." Further, the court
stated that alcohol use was as much a moral issue in the early 1900s as
"deviate sexual behavior in private" was in the early 1990s."s This
comparison of contemporary moral issues led the court to conclude that
"[t]he clear implication is that immorality in private which does 'not
operate to the detriment of others,' is placed beyond the reach of state
action by the guarantees of liberty in the Kentucky Constitution."
The Kentucky Supreme Court also found that the consensual sodomy
statute violated the guarantee of equal protection under the state constitu-
tion. The court determined that equal protection review under the U.S.
Constitution was inapposite and instead applied sections 2 and 3 of the
Kentucky Constitution. The court concluded that these sections pre-
79 Id.
80 Id. at 494-96.
' Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
RId. at 383.
u3d. at 385.
" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494-95.
91 Id. at 495.
'Id. at 496. The court also noted that the court in Campbell quoted extensively
from John Stuart Mill and, in turn, the court in Wasson relied upon Mill. Id. Also,
the court briefly noted Commonwealth v. Bonadlo, 415 A.2d 47 (1980), in which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated that state's sodomy statute noting the
common heritage of the Kentucky Bill of Rights and the Pennsylvania Bill of
Rights. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500. The court quoted from section 3: "'[A]lI men
(persons), when they form a social compact, are equal."' Id. (quoting Ky. CoNsT.
§ 3).
1168 [VOL. S9
CURRENTS IN THE STREAM
vent the majority from criminalizing sexual activity that is outside of
majoritarian preference because to do so is "arbitrary" and lacks rational
basis.'
The court was particularly moved by the factthat the statute singled out
homosexual sodomy for criminalization. The court took note that, when
Kentucky adopted the Model Penal Code in 1974, the General Assembly
took pains to punish consensual sexual activity only of persons of the same
sex, and the court stated that "this is punishing people because they are
different rather than because of what they are doing." 9 The court found
that the Commonwealth's justifications for the distinction were, at best,
unpersuasive and, at worst, outrageous. ° Thus, the court concluded that
there was no proper legislative purpose of the statute-the state was
singling out homosexuals for different treatment for engaging in activity
that heterosexuals were already at liberty to perform." In sum, the court
found no rational basis for criminalizing one type of "extramarital inter-
course" simply because it was more offensive to the majority; to do so was
to criminalize "the sexual [orientation] of homosexuals."'
The Wasson decision is a landmark in a larger transformation taking
place in the state and the country. As discussed earlier, sodomy is rooted
in a medieval theological distillation of the story of the city of Sodom into
the concept of a single, specifically stigmatized sin.93 This distillation
persisted into the mid-nineteenth century. Through that time, sodomy was
a discrete act to be punished-it did not define an individual, but repre-
sented the human capacity to sin.94
From 1880 to around 1950, a homosexual identity began to emerge.95
While colonial Americans conceived of sodomites as individuals perform-
ing certain acts, post-1 880 Americansbegan to recognize thatahomosexual
can exist separately from sexual activity.' An identity arose that some
83Id.
89Id. at 501.
90 Id. The Commonwealth characterized homosexuals as promiscuous pedo-
philes who engage in public sex. Id. It also argued that anal sodomy spreads
infectious disease; however, the Commonwealth failed to show why the statute
should also cover oral sex and why it should not cover male-female anal sex. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 502.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
4 John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between
Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 915,917 (1986).
951 Id. at 917.
9Id. at 917-18.
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believed included personality, emotional, and even physical traits.' Thus,
a world divided into heterosexuals and homosexuals is a recent historical
invention.98
The new social category of homosexual was created by a "dialectic
between external labeling and self-definition." Institutions helped create
the category and, in turn, reinforced it overtime."° This reinforcement has
ultimately created a gay minority."0' Now, sexual activity, which has
gradually been detached from the procreative model, is an entity itself that
marks personal identity and is the foundation of self-worth and important
emotional relationships.0 ' Ultimately, this elevated importance of sexuality
enables greater public intervention into one's personal life; thus, the sexual
politics of the twentieth century have intensified. 3
The Wasson majority recognized the transformation gays have
experienced from sodomite to homosexual. This recognition was advanced
by the court when it refused to follow Bowers.Y The defendant in Bowers
was judged to be a deviant outlaw by what one commentator calls the
"straight mind." ' 5 The straight mind of the Bowers majority labeled the
defendant an "'[o]ther--defined by a criminal act that the [majority]
announced was necessarily a source of moral opprobrium.' 5)106 The Bowers
majority viewed prior privacy cases through the lens of the straight
mind-a mind that conceives of gays as only the sodomite "other."0 7 The
dissent, however, interpreted the same precedent as protecting the sexual
privacy of individuals.! 8 Justice Blackmun stated that "[w]e protect those
rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the
general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an
individual's life.""°
97Id. at 917.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 918.
101 Id.
102Id. at 919.
103 Id.
o Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,497 (Ky. 1992).105 Ayres, supra note 73, at 373.
" Id. (quoting Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle
Transformation in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 893,
905).
10 Id. at 371.
10 vd.10') Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Following Justice Blackmun's lead, the court in Wasson criticized the
Bowers majority for its "misdirected application of the theory of original
intent' and, instead, praised the decision in Loving v. Virginia"° because
it recognized that "a contemporary, enlightened interpretation of the liberty
interest involved in the sexual act made its punishment constitutionally
impermissible.""'
Ill. BEYOND WASSON:
KENTUCKY AS 'TART OF THE MOVING STREAM"
The dissent in Wasson opined that the majority decision created a
slippery slope that would lead to profound ramifications.112 This fear,
however, was unwarranted. In fact, Kentucky is very much in the main-
stream. Judging by a review of the fate of sodomy laws in other states, and
by a broader assessment of the current status of legal protection from anti-
gay bias, Kentucky's mainstream position is revealed.
A. Sodomy Laws
Today, less than half the states criminalize private, consensual sex-
ual relations. Five states maintain "gender-specific"" sodomy pro-
scriptions that apply only to same-sex relations: Arkansas,"' Kan-
"0 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
.. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,497 (Ky. 1992).
1 2 Id. at 509 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
1' One commentator has aptly described "same-sex only" proscriptions as
gender-specific. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 110-11 (2000).
These statutes categorize gays as a "legally distinct 'other."' Id. at 111.
"
4 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997). Currently, the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund is representing Elena Picado and others in challeng-
ing the statute as unconstitutional under the United States and Arkansas con-
stitutions. LambdaLegal Defense and Education Fund, State-by-StateSodomyLaw
Update, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record
=275 (June 14, 2000). In March 2001, an Arkansas trial court struck down the
state's sodomy law under the Arkansas constitution. Picado v. Jegley, No. CV99-
7048 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Sixth Div. Mar. 23, 2001), available at http://www.
lambdalegal.orglsections/ library/decisions/picadodecision.pdf. Echoing other
decisions, the circuit court held that the Arkansas constitution provides greater
protection than the federal constitution and that the sodomy statute violated rights
of privacy and equal protection guaranteed by the Arkansas constitution. Id. The
state is giving "serious consideration" to appealing the decision. Traci Shurley,
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sas,1 5 Missouri, 1 16 Oklahoma,'17 and Texas. 8 Thirteen stateshave "gender-
neutral"119 laws that proscribe both heterosexual and homosexual relations:
Alabama, 120 Arizona, 2' Florida," 2 Idaho," 3 Louisiana, 24 Massachu-
Sodomy Law Struck Down as Violation of Privacy, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Mar. 24,2001, at Al.
115 KAN. STAT.ANN. § 21-3505(a)(1) (1995).
116 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1999). This section has a lack of consent
element that applies to the "sexual contact" provision, but not to the "deviate sexual
intercourse with another person of the same sex" provision. See State v. Cogshell,
997 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. CL App. 1999).
11 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983). The application ofthis section
to consensual sex has been narrowed to homosexuals. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that the sodomy statute is unconstitutional as
applied to consensual, private heterosexual relations without reaching the question
of homosexual relations).
"" TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994). A state appellate court de-
claredthis statuteunconstitutional under the Texas Constitution. Lawrence v. State,
Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-00111-CR, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. App. 2000),
withdrawn en banc, 2001 WL 265994 (Tex. App. 2001). See infra text
accompanying notes 177-93. However, uponrehearing en bancthe courtupheld the
statute. Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-00111-CR, 2001 WL
265994 (Tex. App. 2001).
"9 See Leslie, supra note 113, at 111. While these statutes appear to target
conduct irrespective of the participant's gender, they are applied and interpreted as
same-sex only proscriptions. Id.
120 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1994). Married individuals are exempt by
definition. Id § 13A-6-60(2).
121 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (West 1989).
122 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 2000).
'3 IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie 1997). Marital relations are exempt from the
statute. State v. Holden, 890 P.2d 341 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
sodomy statute may not be constitutionally enforced against private, consensual
marital conduct).
"
4 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986). This section was recently held
constitutional by the state supreme court in a criminal case. See infra text
accompanying notes 206-09. However, in a 1999 case brought by gays and gay
rights activists, a New Orleans trial court judge ruled that the law violated
plaintiffs' right to privacy. Pamela Coyle, Second State Court Overturns Sodomy
Law, NEWORLEANSTIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 18,1999, atAl, available at 1999 WL
4402110. Nonetheless, the judge upheld the law on other grounds. Janet
McConnaughey, Louisiana Court to HearSodomyLaw Case, ASSOCATED PRESS
ONLINE, Jan. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3650222. The state appealed the
privacy ruling, and the state supreme court, shortly after upholding the statute in
the above-referenced criminal case, ordered the trial court to reconsider its
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setts,' 2 Michigan,'26 Minnesota, 27 Mississippi, " North Carolina,129 South
Carolina, 30 Utah,"' and Virginia'1 2
Decriminalization of consensual sodomy has typically been the result
of legislative repea; however, judicial invalidation of sodomy statutes
is not unique. Since Wasson was decided in 1992, courts in five states have
decision. Id. The trial court has scheduled oral argument on the privacy issue for
March 9, 2001. Id. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs have appealed the trial court ruling
upholding the law and arguments, which were limited to non-privacy issues, were
heard by the state appellate court on January 8, 2001. Id.
175 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 34, 35 (Law. Co-op. 1992). Section 34
proscribes sodomy and buggery, § 35 proscribes "unnatural and lascivious acts."
Id.
12 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.158 (West 1991). In 1990, a Wayne
County trial court invalidated the statute on privacy grounds in a suit brought
against the county prosecutor and state attorney general; to date, neither
defendant has appealed. See Frank Bruni, Sodomy Statute is Struck Down:
Laws Violate Right to Privacy, Judge Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 10, 1990,
atBI.
127 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987).
12Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1999). This statute was recently challenged
unsuccessfully. See Millerv. State, 636 So. 2d 391 (Miss. 1994) (declining to reach
the issue whether sodomy statute infringes state constitutional guarantee of
privacy).
129 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1999).
130 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
13 1 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(1) (1999).
'
32 VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996). Recent challenges ofthis statute
have been unsuccessful. See DePriest v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 1 (Va. App.
2000) (rejecting challenge of section 18.2-361 as violation of the right to privacy
because appellants conduct was not private when it was to take place in public
park) (rejecting challenge on establishment ofreligion grounds because statute rests
on long-established secular values).
133 See Status ofUS. SodomyLaws athttp://www.qrd.org/browse/sodomy.laws
(last modified July 9, 1997). Rhode Island has repealed their statute since this list
was updated. 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 24, § 1 (amending section 11-10-1 of the
Rhode Island Laws to eliminate proscriptions of sodomy while maintaining
proscriptions of acts performed with animals). The presence of HIV and AIDS was
one of the main arguments made by those opposed to the repeal; however, the
proponents noted that in three New England states without sodomy laws HIV rates
were lower than in Rhode Island. Jonathan Saltzman, State Senate Repeals 1896
Sodomy Law, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, June 3, 1998, at B1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Prvjnl File.
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invalidated sodomy proscriptions,"34 while only one court of last resort has
upheld the criminalization of consensual sex.135
Four years after Wasson, Kentucky's neighbor invalidated its sodomy
law when, in 1996, the Tennessee Court of Appeals decided Campbell v.
Sundquist.36 There, a group of gay citizens brought a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that Tennessee's Homosexual Practices Act
violated the privacy right guaranteed by several sections of the state
constitution.'37 The state relied heavily upon Bowers v. Hardwick in
defending the statute.13 However, the court, like the court in Wasson,
rejected the argument that they were bound by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, noting that Tennessee may "impose higher standards" when the
Tennessee and federal constitutions are similar.3 9
Instead, the court in Campbell looked to Davis v. Davis, 40 in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a state privacy right that included the
right not to procreate.14' The Tennessee high court understood that the
constitutional drafters could not have anticipated the issues of modern life,
but they did foresee the need to protect individuals from intrusion into
personal, intimate matters. 2 Further, the court in Campbellnoted Tennes-
see's strong, historic commitment to liberty and freedom from government
134 See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating state sodomy law
on privacy grounds); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (invalidating
state sodomy law on privacy grounds); Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR,
14-99-0011 1-CR, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. App. June 8,2000) (invalidating state
.sodomy law on equal protection grounds); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (invalidating state sodomy law on privacy grounds);
Williams v. State, No. 9803603 1/CC-1059,1998 ExtraLEXIS 260 (3altimore City
Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998).
13- State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000).
116 Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
131 Id. at 253. The constitutional sections cited by the plaintiffs were sections
1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 19, and 27 of Article I of the Tennessee Constitution. Id. In finding
that the plaintiffs had standing the court stated that "the plaintiffs' status as
homosexuals confers upon them an interest distinct from that of the general public
with respect to the HPA." Id. at 256.
13S Id. at 258.
13 9 Id. at 259. Accord Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Ky.
1992).
10 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
141 Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 259-60 (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601).
142 d. at 260 (quoting Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600).
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interference.143 Thus, the court held that private, consensual sexual matters
are "at the heart of... the right to privacy" even for same-sex relations. ' "
The courtrejectedthe state's "compelling interests" as lacking validity.
The court rebutted the state's attempts to portray gays as pariahs: "We
think... that the State's attempt to rescue homosexuals from a socially
unpopular lifestyle does not provide a compelling reason or even a valid
reason for infringement of [a] fundamental right."'45 The court continued
by stating that "even if we assume that the State can punish a'lifestyle,' the
record before us indicates that there is no one 'homosexual lifestyle' in
which all or even a majority of homosexuals engage.
Two of Tennessee's "compelling interests" were more reasonable and
have commonly been proffered by state's defending their sodomy laws:
reducing the spread of AIDS and protecting public morality.47 While the
court in Campbellrecognized that AIDS prevention is a compelling interest
of the state, it determined that the statute did not fit the goal because
behavior that presented no risk of spreading disease was prohibited."
Similarly, the court in Wasson rejected the AIDS justification because the
Kentucky law permitted behavior that posed a risk of spreading the
disease. 149
Tennessee's public morality argument was also rejected. The court
recognized that laws often reflect the public's moral choices." However,
when moral choices are made into law they face constitutional limits.'
Further, the advancement of a moral choice must be compelling enough to
override a citizen's privacy right.'" Here, the court echoed the sentiments
regarding majoritarian morality expressed in Wasson: majority will should
"not be imposed upon the minority absent some showing of harmful
consequences created by the actions of the minority."'53
14 3 Id. at 261. Similarly, the court in Wassonrecognizedatradition of individual
liberty in Kentucky. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 492-93.
'44 Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 262.
145 Id. at 263.
'" Id. The court in Wasson blunted Kentucky's lifestyle-based justifications by
calling them "simply outrageous." Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501.
147 Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 263.
14' Id.
149 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501.
110 Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 264.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 264-65.
15 3 Id. at 265 (citing Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 496-97).
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On the heels of Campbell, courts in two other states invalidated
consensual sodomy proscriptions on privacy grounds, similarly rejecting
morality-based arguments. In 1997, the Montana Supreme Court decided
Gryczan v. State ." This court also found that its state constitution provides
broader protection than the federal constitution; as well, the Montana
Constitution explicitly grants a right of individual privacy."1
In defending its sodomy statute, Montana argued that the appropriate
test for determining whether a fundamental right to privacy exists was the
Palko test applied by the Court in Bowers.156 The court disagreed and found
the two-part Katz test to be appropriate. 7 Moreover, the court determined
that, even under a Palko test, the right to privacy in Montana includes
consensual same-sex relations when it stated: "Montana's Constitution...
explicitly protects individual or personal-autonomy privacy as a fundamen-
tal right... [and] it is hard to imagine any activity... more deserving of
protection from governmental interference than non-commercial, consen-
sual adult sexual activity.""'
Montana limited its justifications for the sodomy statute to AIDS
prevention and the protection of public morals." 9 Following an informed
discussion of HIV and AIDS, the court in Gryczan concluded that the
statute did not relate to the state's public health goal because the statute
included conduct not associated with the spread of AIDS and excluded
high-risk behavior among non-homosexuals."6 The state's public morals
"'4Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997). As in Kentucky, the Montana
sodomy statute was limited to same-sex relations following a 1970s criminal law
revision. Id. at 116. Like Campbell, this case was a declaratory judgment action
brought by gay citizens. Id. at 115. The court in Gryczan found that the plaintiffs
had standing for reasons similar to those expressed in Campbell. Id. at 120.
' Id. at 121. A right of privacy is expressly granted in Article II, Section 10 of
the Montana Constitution. Id.
IMId. at 122. Under the Palko test, a statute fails if it "violate[s] those 'funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions."' Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328
(1937)).
s7 Id. When using a Katz test, which is derived from Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a court considers whether
a person has an actual expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is
recognized by society as reasonable. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 121 (citing Katz, 389
U.S. at 361).
I's Id. at 123.159 See id.
160Id. at 123-24.
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argument was similarly doomed when the court noted that the judiciary is
not required to acquiesce simply because a law reflects a moral choice.'
Advancing the sentiment of Wasson and Campbell, the court delivered the
final blow to the state's case when it stated that "a tyranny sincerely
exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive' and that
"those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for
they do so with the approval of their own conscience."'62
A year after Gryczan, the Georgia sodomy statute, the very one that had
gained notoriety in Bowers, met its end. In 1998, the Georgia Supreme
Court struck down the statute in Powell v. State.63 Powell had been
convicted of a lesser-included offense of sodomy and subsequently
appealed, contending that the statute infringed his right of privacy under the
Georgia Constitution.'" The court in Powell did not look to specific
constitutional language. Instead, the court turned to Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance,'" an early twentieth-century case that recognized
a right of privacy in Georgia arising from the state constitution's Due
Process Clause."*
The court in Powell stated that, since Pavesich was decided, Georgia
courts had developed a jurisprudence recognizing a right of privacy as a
fundamental right. 67 The court in Pavesich determined that the right of
privacy was "ancient law," and the majority in Powell characterized the
Pavesich opinion as a ringing endorsement of the "right to be let alone.' 68
The majority then reviewed several privacy cases to determine that the right
to privacy had withstood the test of various instances of state intrusion. 69
By drawing on principles stated inPavesich, and by lookingto Gryczan and
Campbell, the court concluded that intimate sexual behavior is constitution-
ally protected, because it "is at the heart of the Georgia Constitution's
protection of the right of privacy."17
16Id. at 125.
162 Id. (quoting C.S. LEwis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD
IN THE DOCK 287,292 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970)).
" Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
'4Id. at 20-21.
'
65 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
'66Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21.
167 Id
.
168 d. at22.
169 See id.
70Id. at 24.
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The state attempted to defend the statute by arguing that it was within
the state's police power and, predictably, that it bolstered public mor-
als.' The court rejected the state's police power argument, noting that
valid exercises of police power require public benefit without undue
oppression of the individual." Because the court had determined that the
statute was designed to reach only private, consensual conduct, the statute
did not benefit the public, while the individual was unduly oppressed."l
The court in Powell responded to Georgia's public morals argument as
did the courts in Wasson, Campbell, and Gryczan: the majority rejected the
notion that courts must acquiesce to morality legislation." Further, the
court recognized that majoritarian morality must be balanced against
constitutional guarantees.1" Thus, the courts in Wasson, Campbell,
Gryczan, and Powell together express the view that consensual sex is a
highly private matter and, while morality will always be debated, "'no
[significant] state interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a
particular belief is followed by a number of people, or even a majority.' "176
The Court of Appeals of Texas for the Fourteenth District invalidated
Texas's sodomy statute, which applied only to same-sex relations, by
taking a different approach. In Lawrence v. State,17 two men pleaded nolo
171 Id. at 25.
172Id.
" Id. The court determined that the statute was designed to reach only private,
consensual conduct because there were numerous other statutes on the books aimed
at assault and public sex. Id. at 24-25.
174 Id. at 25.
175 See id. at 25-26.
176 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Ky. 1992) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980)).
" Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-0011 1-CR, 2000 WL
729417 (Tex. App. June 8, 2000), withdrawn en banc, 2001 WL 265994 (Tex.
App. 2001). In March 2001, upon rehearing en banc, the court upheld the sodomy
statute. Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-0011 1-CR, 2001 WL
265994 (Tex. App. 2001). The en banc majority reviewed the defendants' equal
protection and privacy claims taking a narrow, traditional approach. See id at* 1-9.
The court rejected the claim that the statute discriminates against gays by simply
stating that sexual orientation is not a suspect class and by embracing the State's
contention that the statute advances public morality. Id at *3-5. However, the
majority never articulated how public morality is advanced by regulating private
intimate activity. See id.
The majority also rejected the defendants' claim of gender discrimination. Id
at *7. Rather than recognizing that gender determines the criminality of conduct
under the statute, see infra text accompanying notes 190-93, the court simply
considered whether the statute applies equally to men and women. Lawrence, 2001
WL 265994 at *6-7.
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contendre to a sodomy charge and subsequently appealed, challenging the
statute on privacy and equal protection grounds under both the federal and
Texas constitutions.17 The court found that the Texas Equal Rights
Amendment ("ERA") was dispositive and that the equal protection
guarantee provided by the state constitution is more extensive than the
federal guarantee." The ERA prohibits the denial of equality under law on
the basis of sex, as well as other grounds.
80
The court looked to state supreme court precedent to determine that sex
is a suspect classification; thus, strict scrutiny was warranted.' The court
then stated that the proper inquiry was whether the defendants were treated
differently under the statute from others engaging in the same activity
solely on the basis of gender." The court paid careful attention to the fact
that Texas, like Kentucky, prohibited both heterosexual and homosexual
sodomy until 1974, at which time opposite-sex relations became legal."
The court recognized that after 1974 "the distinction between legal and
illegal conduct was not the act, but rather the sex of one of the partici-
pants.""' Thus, the appellants were treated differently solely because of
their gender."8
The court rejected the privacy challenge by relying upon Bowers and by stating
that there is no "general constitutional right to privacy." Id at *7-9. Also, the court,
not surprisingly, relied upon Justinian and Blackstone for support, even though it
did not explain why snippets of ancient law should be a guide for post-modem
society. See id at *9.
Ultimately, the en banc majority echoed the tack taken by the Louisiana
Supreme Court when it upheld its state's sodomy law. See infratext accompanying
notes 206-10. The defendants inLawrence, however, plan to appeal. Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Two Men Continue to Fight to Overturn Texas Anti-
GayLaw, athttp://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=
820 (Apr. 16,2001). Also, the Texas decision is limited to the court's jurisdiction,
which includes the greater Houston area. See Thx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.220
(West 1988).
71 Lawrence, 2000 WL 729417 at *1.
"'
9 Id. The appeals court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had limited the
right of privacy, implicating the analysis in two cases in which another Texas
appellate panel had found the sodomy statuteto be unconstitutional. Id. at *2. Thus,
the court limited its analysis to equal protection. Id.
'o Id.
'
8
'Id. at *3 (quoting In re Unnamed Baby McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696,698 (Tex.
1987)).
1812 Id.
183 See id.
1'4 Id.
185 Id.
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The state conceded that no compelling interest could support the gender
distinction.'8 Instead, the state contended that the statute did not discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender because it applied to both men and women."'
Further, Texas, as expected, argued that the statute fulfilled the interests of
enforcing morality and promoting family values.'
The court rejected the state's argument that because the statute applied
to both men and women it did not discriminate."' The court looked to
Loving v. Virginia,"° in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a similar
argument as applied to race. The Texas court noted: "By using the race of
an individual as the sole determinant of the criminality of his conduct the
State created and perpetuated an invidious racial classification in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9" The court then applied the same analysis
to gender to determine that the statute made the same conduct criminal for
some but not others based only on the sex of the individuals involved."
Thus, "the sex of the individual [was] the sole determinant of the criminal-
ity of the conduct."193
The situation in Maryland was unusual. There, a trial court invalidated
the state's sodomy proscriptions in Williams v. State." Various plaintiffs
had sought a declaration that one of the sodomy statutes 95 and the lewdness
statute were unconstitutional as applied." The court analyzed the standing
issue by looking to Gryczan and Campbell and determined that the
plaintiffs concern was with more than the mere existence of the statute. 97
The court then applied a subjective standard to determine if the plaintiff's
18 Id. at *4.
187 Id.
"' Id. The court did not address the state's morality interests because they were
offered as "legitimate purposes" and, thus, could not save the statute under the
court's application of strict scrutiny. See id.
189 Id.
o Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
191 Lawrence, 2000 WL 729417 at *4 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11).
192 Id.
193 Id.
" Williams v. State, No. 98036031/CC-1059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (Balti-
more City Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998).
" Maryland had two statutes prohibiting sodomous acts: section 553 covered
anal sex and section 554 covered oral sex. See MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553,554
(1996).
'96 Williams, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260, at *2.
197 Id. at *13.
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fears of prosecution were real.1 Finding that genuine concerns had been
expressed, the court determined that the matter was justiciable."'
The plaintiffs argued that the holding ofSchochet v. State,2" in which
the Maryland high court ruled that section 554 did not cover private,
consensual heterosexual activity, should be extended to also exempt
homosexual activity.2 1 The state responded that the holding of Schochet
should be extended if the plaintiffs were found to have standing because the
complaint could be dismissed for failing to state a claim.2'
The state of Maryland raised two concerns to justify their position: that
equal protection issues arise from criminalizing homosexual conduct but
not heterosexual conduct and that criminalizing homosexual conduct could
be an unconstitutional infringement of privacy.2 3 The court agreed and
followed the reasoning of Schochet when it held that the statute did not
prohibit"consensual, non-commercial, heterosexual orhomosexual activity
between adults in private." u° In the end, the state consented to the court's
declaration that sections 553 and 554 do not apply to consensual, private
sexual activity.20
5
In a case that shows outright refusal to join "the moving stream," the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld its state's sodomy law in State v. Smith.2 6
The case arose from defendant Smith's conviction of a lesser-included
offense of consensual sodomy.207 The lower appellate court found the
sodomy statute unconstitutional because it infringed the right of privacy
guaranteed in the Louisiana Constitution.2 8 However, the high court
191 Id. at *13-14.
199 Id. at *"15.
20 Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
201 See Williams, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260, at *15-17.
202 Id. at *17-18.2o3 Id. at *18_19.
204 Id. at *22.
20S Id. at * 1.
206State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000). See also Commonwealth v. Paris,
Nos. K96062, K96063, 1999 WL 1499542 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 16, 1999) (rejecting
a challenge to Virginia's sodomy law and finding that the Virginia Constitution is
coextensive with the federal constitution and that the analysis in Bowers was
dispositive).
207 Smith, 766 So. 2d at 504. The defendant in this case engaged in heterosexual
acts. See id.
'Id. Article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution contains a Privacy
Clause that provides a guarantee against unreasonable invasions of privacy. Id. at
505.
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reinstated Smith's conviction, concluding that extending the privacy right
to include consensual oral and anal sex would be a "serious misinterpreta-
tion" of the state constitution.20
The Louisiana Supreme Court took a hands-off approach by declaring
that expanding the right of privacy would violate the principle of separation
of powers.210 Moreover, the court reviewed the history of sodomy
proscriptions and concluded that it was obvious that the right to privacy
cannot include conduct that was considered criminal at the time the state
constitution was ratified.' As a result, the court placed the will of the
majority above the rights of the individual even though the state constitu-
tion protects privacy. The court noted: "The question is not one of what is
good or wise for Louisiana society, but rather whether the people's
majority which adopted the constitution at referendum intended to deprive
the legislature of the power to deal with the matter."2 2
The court showed great deference to majority will by stating that it
would be unconstitutional for jurists to "elevate [their] own personal
notions of individual 'liberty' over the collective wisdom of the voters'
elected representatives' belief." 3 Further, the court engaged in faulty
reasoning when it presumed the constitutionality of the sodomy statute. The
court noted: "A violation of the criminal law of this state is not justified as
an element of the 'liberty' or 'privacy' guaranteed by this state's constitu-
tion. The freedom to violate criminal law is simply anarchy."214 Clearly, the
court ignored the principle that conduct cannot be criminal if it is constitu-
tionally protected. The court subverted the concept of supremacy by
placing the statute above the constitution and neglected its responsibility
to fully analyze privacy rights under the state constitution.
Instead of a careful analysis of the state constitution, the court relied on
Bowers to blunt any attempt to secure greater privacy rights in Louisiana.21 5
As well, the court equated judicial interpretation of the state's Privacy
Clause with an impermissible judicial amendment to the state con-
stitution.216 Moreover, the court appeared to address gay citizens when it
stated that if the court were to interpret the constitution as affording
209 Id. at 512.210 Id. at 506-07.
211 Id. at 508.
212 Id. at 508-09.
213 Id. at 510.
214 Id.
215 See id at 509.216Id. at 510.
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greater privacy rights then "any and all disaffected groups unable to ob-
tain legislative redress need only convince a majority of this court that
what they seek is an implicit 'right' afforded by the Louisiana Constitu-
tion., 217
The court in Smith specifically distinguished Wasson by noting that
Wasson relied on language in the Kentucky Constitution that has no
counterpart in the Louisiana Constitution."' However, the greater
distinction between Smith and Wasson, Campbell, Gryczan, and Powell is
revealed in the issue of public morality. The court in Smith read the
constitution as nothing but an embodiment of majority will to which the
court was required to yield. In contrast, the courts that struck down their
states's sodomy laws understood that their duty was not to acquiesce to
morality legislation, butto interpret constitutional guarantees to achieve the
best balance of competing interests. In this way, constitutional provisions
protect all citizens rather than facilitating a"tyranny... exercised for the
good of its victims."2 9
B. Protection from Discrimination
Anti-discrimination law is an area in which Kentucky is "part of the
moving stream." At present, protections from sexual orientation discrimina-
tion primarily exist at the local level. Only eleven states ban sexual orien-
tation bias: California, Connecticut Hawaii, Massachusettsm Minn-
esota,22 Nevada, New Hampshire, 6 New Jersey, 1 7 Rhode Island,"2
217 Id.
218 Id. at 511 n.1 1. The court attacked the court in Wasson for interpreting the
Kentucky Constitution in a manner that "would be a formula for anarchy." Id.219 Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,125 (Mont. 1997) (quoting C.S. LEWIS, The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK 287, 292 (1970)).220 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12920, 12921, 12926, 12940, 12955, 12955.8 (West
Supp. 2000).
221 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81a to 81r (West 1995).
22 HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 368-1, 378-2 (1993 & Supp. 1999).
223 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151 B, § § 1, 3,4; id ch. 272, § § 92A, 98 (Law. Co-op.
1992, 1999 & Supp. 2000).
4 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01,363.02,363.021,363.03 (West Supp. 2000).
2 NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 281.370, 610.010, 610.020 (2000).
m N.H. RE. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1, :2, :6 to :8, :10, :16, :17 (Supp. 1999).
227 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-3 to 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000).
228 R.I.GEN.LAws §§ 11-24-2, 11-24-2.2,28-5-2,28-5-3,28-5-5 to 28-5-7, 28-
5-7.3, 34-37-1 to 34-37-4, 34-37-4.2, 34-37-4.3, 34-37-5.2 to 34-37-5A (Supp.
1999).
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Vermont,' and Wisconsin. 3 In 2001, Maryland will become the twelfth
state to ban sexual orientation bias when a bill passed by the state
legislature is signed into law." While most states do not ban sexual
orientation bias, over 150 cities and counties provide some degree of
protection. 2 A large number of theie localities are in jurisdictions that do
not provide state-wide protection. 3
Kentucky reflects the general trend: the Commonwealth has no state-
wide anti-discrimination statute covering sexual orientation, but three
localities currently ban such bias. 4 A bill was introduced in the 2000
General Assembly seeking to ban sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, housing, and housing and mortgage-related transactions,2 " but
the bill died in committee when the chairman decided not to call it for a
hearing? 6 The chairman characterized the committee as reluctant to get
involved in gay rights. 7 The bill will return in the 2001 session of the
legislature;-, it is unlikely that it will face better prospects.
Local laws banning sexual orientation bias have fared better in
Kentucky. In 1999, four localities enacted anti-discrimination ordinances:
229 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 961, 963, 1001, 1013, 1026, 1028, 1041 (Supp.
2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 1211, 1302,4724, 10403 (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2362,2410,2488,4502, 4503 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§
495, 1621, 1726 (Supp. 2000).
230 WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.04, 16.765 (West Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
21.35 (West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.12 (West Supp. 2000); Ws. STAT. ANN.
§ 38.23 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.1011, 66.1213, 66.1301, 106.50
(West Supp. 2000); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32, 111.70, 111.85 (West
1997); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 230.18 (West Supp. 2000); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 234.29
(West 1987).
23 Jeff Barker, House Oks Gay Rights Legislation, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 31,
2001, at B1. The bill's passage was a victory for Governor Glendening who had
been lobbying for the bill for two years. See id
12 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Summary ofStates, Cities, and
Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at http://
www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=217 (lastmodified
Oct. 25, 1999).
M3 Id.
"' See infra notes 239-42.
3s H.R 7,2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000).
"' Rick McDonough, Two Bills on Gay Rights Going Nowhere in House,
LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2000, at Al.
237 Id.
238 H.R. 116,2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2001).
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Louisville, 9 Lexington,2' Jefferson County,24 and Henderson. 42 The
passage of these ordinances created significant controversy and revealed
divisions between Kentuckians. The supporters of the ordinances saw their
struggle in terms of fairness and civil rights. The opponents couched their
opposition in terms of morality, decency, and religious values.
In each locality, protests and public debates revealed the contrasting
stands taken by citizens.243 In Louisville, an African-American pastor led
the opposition, rejecting the notion that protecting people against sexual
orientation bias had anything to do with civil rights.2' Rather, he said that
the issue was sin and that "[i]t has everything to do with the moral rights
of people who believe in God."245 However, an African-American alderman
who voted forthe ordinance viewed the issue differently. Before casting his
vote for the ordinance, Alderman Unseld said: "The days of discrimination
need to fade into darkness."
The issue in other cities was equally heated. In Lexington, council
persons characterized the debate as mean-spirited and said that they had
been threatened.247 There were churches in Lexington that supported the
anti-discrimination law, while the pastor from a church outside of
23 The Louisville ordinance is limited to employment discrimination. LOUIS-
VILLE, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 98, §§ 98.00, 98.15-98.18 (1999).
240 The Lexington ordinance covers employment, housing, and public accom-
modations. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY., CHARTER& CODEOF ORDINANCES
§ 2-33 (1999).
24 The Jefferson ordinance covers employment, housing, and public accom-
modations. JEFFERSONCOUNTY,KY.,CODEOF ORDINANCES ch. 92, §§ 92.01-92.07
(1999).
242 The Henderson law covered employment, housing, and public accom-
modations. Henderson, Ky., Ordinance 33-99 (Sept. 28, 1999), repealed by
Henderson, Ky., Ordinance 07-2001 (Mar. 13, 2001).
3 But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 509 (Ky. 1992)
(Lambert, J., dissenting) (predicting that the majority opinion will be an obstacle
to those who wish to speak against gays). Considering the level of anti-gay
sentiment expressed during the ordinance debates, it appears that Justice Lambert's
prediction was wrong.
244 Leslie Scanlon, Black Pastor Fights Protection for Gays: Minister Says
Issue is Not Like Fight for Racial Equality, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan.
20, 1999, at B1.
24s Id.
24RickMcDonough, Gay-rights Ordinance Passes: Aldermen Vote 7-5 to Out-
law Job Discrimination, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 1999, at Al.
247 Joseph Gerth, Lexington Passes Gay-rights Law, LOUISVILLE COURIER-
JOURNAL, July 9, 1999, at Al.
2000-2001] 1185
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Lexington condemned the law, saying that it 'endorse[d] a lifestyle that
God deems immoral." '248 In Henderson, more than one thousand people
attended two public meetings.249 At one of these meetings, the debate
became intense when a citizen threatened commissioners saying that
anyone voting for the ordinance deserved to be thrown into the river with
"a rope tied around [his] neck with a rock at the other end." ' This
sentiment was vindicated when the city repealed the anti-bias ordinance
eighteen months after its passage.
The significant debate surrounding the anti-bias ordinances was not lost
on state legislators. Under the guise of promoting the uniform application
of civil rights in Kentucky, several legislators sponsored a bill that would
have overturned the four anti-discrimination laws by eliminating all local
civil rights ordinances.5 2 One of the sponsors had originally planned a bill
to specifically outlaw local gay-rights laws.&3 However, it was decided by
the sponsors that a broader approach of eliminating local civil rights
jurisdiction would be less controversial. 4 The sponsors seemed uncon-
cerned -by the divisive nature of their bill, and were sympathetic to
individuals who opposed the local anti-bias laws.55 Ultimately, the bill died
in committee because the committee chair did not want the state micro-
managing local laws. 6
Reaction to the anti-discrimination laws has not been limited to the
state legislature. In the Fall of 1999, Barrett Hyman, a Louisville doctor,
filed a federal suit against both the Louisville and Jefferson County
ordinances." Hyman challenged the ordinances by asserting that they
violate his religious freedom.5 Hyman has several employees and stated
24 Todd Van Campen, Churches Differ on Gay Bias Proposal: Issue Shows
Split in Christian Views, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 30, 1999, at Al.249 Chris Poynter, Kentucky Gay-Rights Battle, LouIsVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL,
Oct. 18, 1999, at Al.250 Id.
"s Henderson, Ky., Oridnance 07-2001 (Mar. 13, 2001). The city also revised
its own employment policy to permit anti-gay bias. See Henderson, Ky., Ordinance
08-2001 (Mar. 13, 2001).
252 H.R. 485,2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000).
253 McDonough, supra note 236, at Al.
4 Id.
255 Id.
2Id.
" Rick McDonough & Sheldon S. Shafer, FederalAgency Backs Gay Rights,
LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Aug. 17, 2000, at Al.
8 Andrew Wolfson, Lawsuit Challenges City Gay-Rights Law, LOUISVILLE
COURIER-JOURNAL, Sept. 14, 1999, at Al.
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he did not want to be required to employ homosexuals because he believes
them to be sinful and offensive to God. 9 However, Hyman's lawyer
acknowledged that no federal court has invalidated a law prohibiting sexual
orientation bias on free exercise grounds.2'
Several months after Hyman filed his lawsuit, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed a brief in favor of the anti-discrimination laws? 6' The
Department filed the brief because it claimed that if Hyman's suit is
successful it will interfere with the American interest in assuring equal
employment opportunity for all.262 The Louisville law director stated that
the federal brief indicated the importance of the Hyman case to civil rights
matters across the country.? Indeed, this may be accurate considering the
large number of local ordinances banning sexual orientation bias.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky is "part of the moving stream." A majority of states have
disposed of their sodomy laws, recognizing that gay individuals are more
than the sodomite "other." Many of these states have judicially invalidated
their statutes, joining with Kentucky in balancing expressions of moral
sentiment against the ideals of individual autonomy, personal privacy, and
equal treatment under the law. As well, Kentucky cities are not alone in
their efforts to legislatively combat sexual orientation discrimination. The
Hyman case is an indication that Kentucky is "in the stream" because the
outcome of that case could have a profound impact throughout the nation.
Certainly, issues surrounding sexual orientation will take years to
resolve. Matters of sexual privacy and discrimination are a significant
starting point. As we reach consensus on those matters, we will be better
prepared to deal with others. For now, it appears that Kentucky will move
neither too far ahead nor too far behind other states in its treatment of gays
under the law. The hope is that the Commonwealth will remain in the water
and "part of the moving stream."
z9 Id.
e Id. In March 2001, a federal judge dismissed Hyman's lawsuit and granted
summary judgment to the defendants. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp.
2d 528,549 (W.D. Ky. 2001). The court rejected all offHyman's claims, including
those brought under the federal and Kentucky constitutions. See id at 536-49.
" McDonough & Shafer, supra note 257, at Al.
262 Id.
263 d.
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